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ABSTRACT 
The concept of "nation" is currently being applied on more than one level. Whereas many Qué-
bécois maintain that a nation should be a state, world expérience shows many nations as forming 
constituent parts of larger-scaled nations. Sovereignty must be seen as having priority over "associa-
tion". A sécession of Québec would split Canada into at least three portions, and would cause a 
reorientation of the remnant pièces away from the centre. Several potential boundary problems would 
exist. The récent development of a Canadian nationalism should not be overlooked. 
KEYWORDS: Political Geography, Nation, Nationalism, State, Sovereignty, Séparation, 
Canada, Québec. 
RÉSUMÉ 
Andrew F. BURGHARDT : Nation, État et unité territoriale : une vue d'outre-Outaouais. 
Le concept de « nation » est couramment utilisé selon plusieurs sens. Alors qu'un certain nombre 
de Québécois soutiennent qu'une nation doit être un État, il existe dans le monde des nations consti-
tuantes de plus grandes nations. La souveraineté doit avoir priorité sur l'association. Une sécession 
du Québec diviserait le Canada en trois parties au moins et entraînerait leur réorientation à l'opposé 
du centre. Il y aurait des problèmes éventuels de frontière. Le réveil du nationalisme canadien doit 
retenir l'attention. 
MOTS-CLÉS : Géographie politique, nation, nationalisme, État, souveraineté, séparatisme, 
Canada, Québec. 
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No résident of Canada can daim to be completely objective in discussing la problé-
matique géo-politique du Québec. Ail he can hope to do is try to be honest in his ap-
proach and fair in his judgements. In my case, I can scarcely daim to speak for a consen-
sus of Ontario opinion, much less for that of ail of Canada outside Québec. In this essay I 
will présent an assessment of the situation, which, though strongly personal, still repre-
sents a thoughtful view "from the outside." 
At the beginning, it is essential to stress the importance of the writer's géographie 
stance. Where one stands, the place from which one views the situation, makes a great 
différence in Canada. The Québécois1 tendency to equate Ottawa and Canada is much 
too simplistic. Even if we lack many of the régional particularisms of Europe, we hâve 
perhaps even more a sensé of distance. Our attention and interest suffer a marked "dis-
tance decay". It is well known that the major régions of Canada view the Québec situation 
differently; even within The Prairies, Alberta sees the matter differently than does Mani-
toba. 
The relative disinterest of the Western provinces is a resuit not only of distance, but 
also of a sensé of increasing power, and of a shifting external focus. The natural wealth of 
the area has bred a feeling of self-sufficiency which has inevitably tended to loosen the old 
feelings of dependency on the East. The growth of the Pacific trading realm has moved 
attention increasingly away from Europe and its Eastern Canadian intermediaries. The 
strong American présence in Calgary has accentuated North-South ties at the expense of 
the historié ties built with Montréal by the C.P.R. To the Canadians of the West, Québécois 
aspirations tend to seem both distant and presumptuous. 
In Southern Ontario, it matters considerably where one lives in relation to Toronto. 
The industrial concentration West of Toronto has its world-view so concentrated upon itself 
and on Toronto, the acknowledged leader, that it tends to see Canada as itself enlarged. 
From the vantage point of Hamilton, it is surprising how distant Québec seems to be. To 
be honest, Cornwall and Brockville can seem equally remote. It is as if our terrestrial 
consciousness were bound in by Oshawa, Barrie, and Windsor, with ail other areas, al-
though known to exist, being psychologically at a distance. Despite its spécial contacts 
with Montréal and Ottawa, Toronto also opérâtes with a strong local fixation. With the 
typical arrogance of a primate city, Toronto scarcely seems to admit the existence of any 
cultural vitality in the other cities of Southern Ontario. East of Toronto the matter is diffé-
rent, of course; Québec is seen as close at hand and significant. 
As a résident of Hamilton I cannot help but hâve a view of Québec which is partially 
obstructed by the présence of Toronto. But I intend to examine the question as a citizen 
who is vitally concerned with the issues involved. I will not deal with the confused matter of 
économie costs to Québec in case of séparation, nor with the matter of reimbursements 
for Fédéral properties. Nor will I try to deal with the thorny questions of shared costs and 
responsibilities in the case of sovereignty-association. I will, however, try to be frank. Much 
of the material may be spéculative but I feel that the contingencies of the future must be 
faced if man is not to advance blindly into that future. 
NATION AND STATE 
It has been my expérience that Québécois and others often argue past each other. 
Whenever the question of Québec's status arises, the Québécois stress the cultural and 
political éléments of the situation, whereas the Anglophones usually stress the économie 
éléments. The former tend to be ideological and emphasize the rights of "the nation"; the 
latter tend to be pragmatic and emphasize the importance of jobs and industrial develop-
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ment. Each faction proves its point and becomes exasperated at the other's failure to 
understand and accept what seems obvious. 
Perhaps more serious hâve been the implicit disagreements over the meaning and 
significance of "nation", and of its relation to "state". Confusion concerning "nation" has 
plagued Canadian political parties in récent years. Well remembered is the "two nations" 
concept which caused a minor split in the Progressive Conservative Party a décade ago. 
The issue arose again in the élection campaign Debate of the leaders in May, 1979. Two 
important questions need to be examined: 1. what is included in the définition of "nation"?, 
is full political sovereignty necessarily included?; and 2. need the concept be limited to a 
single political level? 
Définitions of "nation" vary according to language, discipline, and person. Quite 
clearly, however, a nation is a cultural entity. A sufficiently large group of people share in 
common a number of traits, attitudes, and memories, which they feel to be of vital impor-
tance. Thèse people feel the existence of a bond which unités them, and sets them off 
from other groups of people, other "nations", nearby. In this century, the most notable 
common characteristic has been a shared language, since language is the vehicle for 
transmitting and sharing national literature, plans, and interprétations of history2. To be 
most effective, the language should be set off sharply from neighbouring language groups; 
frequently language divisions serve also as nation divisions. 
Religion is also a notable ingrédient of nationhood. In our secularist âge, church-going 
may not be an impressive statistic, but the underlying premises, tempéraments, and life-
styles of a faith-system remain in a people long after church attendance may hâve dwin-
dled. Religion may serve as a vital foundation for a nation even after the language has 
been eroded away, as in Scotland and Ireland3. 
A sensé of common history is also very important. History is man's ordering of the 
myriad events of the past. It is man who categorizes, classifies, and gives meaning to 
selected happenings. If séparation from the United States were the sine qua non of Cana-
dian history, then Québec 1775 would be considered to be more important than Québec 
1759, and Lundy's Lane more important than Louisbourg. History becomes important 
when a large group of people share in a reconstruction of the past which seems, to them, 
to set them off sharply from peoples nearby. 
The emotional impact of a commonly-accepted history is accentuated by the memo-
ries of a distinct, preferably independent, past. Thus the Habsburgs of Austria were faced 
not only with Magyar, Czech, and Croation cultural movements, but also with nationalisms 
based on vivid memories of the Kingdoms of Hungary, Bohemia, and Croatia. Such me-
mories are important because they suggest strongly the right to local control of the territory 
concerned, the ability of thèse people to govern themselves once again, and the fact that 
independence would represent a restitution of the lost right to rule. 
Thèse memories must include a well-defined territory. A "homeland" is an absolute 
necessity4, and its bounds should be capable of sharp définition. If the territorial limits 
coïncide with a set of functioning political units, the national feeling will tend to be enhan-
ced, in that the limits supply a clear frame for the group spatial perception. Thus the désire 
for autonomy is easier to express and implement for the Catalons and Corsicans than it is 
for the Basques or Bretons. 
There is thus the tendency for aspiring nations to make use of the concreteness of 
defined territories in préférence to the vagueness of cultural distributions. At least until 
now, the separatist Québécois hâve made the existing provincial boundaries the frame of 
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their aspirations, and hâve not paid serious attention to the question of linguistic distribu-
tion along and near the boundaries. 
With a clearly-defined territory and an internalized cultural unity, a sensé of nation 
may grow strong. If it does, does this unity of group and land require full political expres-
sion as well? Certainly some measure of autonomy appears to be désirable. Even if alien 
rulers were so wise and appréciative as to nurture and develop the culture, the members 
of the nation would still wish to possess enough power to assure the continuance of the 
group. During the first half of this century the nation-state became the political idéal of the 
European world, and many political scientists seem to assume that true nationhood requi-
res full sovereignty5. On the other hand, most multi-cultural states of the world (and there 
are many of them) hâve refused to accept this severely disruptive ideological position, and 
hâve preferred autonomy, or less, to the granting of sovereignty. 
If the Québécois wish to consider themselves as forming a nation in the cultural sensé 
of the word, most Canadians would, I believe, accept that position. Lord Durham's cele-
brated statement of two nations in one bosom is well known, and many Anglophones 
appreciate and treasure the différences between the "two founding peoples." Whether 
accepting the Québécois as a nation gives us two nations is another matter. The différen-
ces among the Atlantic provinces, Southern Ontario, the West, and the North seem to be 
great enough to make the existence of one Anglophone nation highly questionable. 
Most définitions présuppose that the nation exists at only one level, and that that level 
is an ultimate, superseded only by concepts such as "humanity". This is probably the 
reason why the feeling is so strong that a nation should also be a state, and vice versa. In 
fact we normally allude to relations beyond the state level as being international, not inter-
state, and the world's forum refers to itself as The United Nations, and not the United-
States, which would be more accurate, though confusing. 
This équation of nation and state flies in the face of présent human expérience. In 
Spain, Yugosiavia, the United Kingdom (itself an instructive name!), and many of the new 
states of Africa and Asia, the nations or their équivalents are generally allowed to develop 
their cultural identities, but at the same time are expected to conform to the overall, uni-
fying régime. This conformity is based upon the possibility of a sensé of kinship to some 
larger social entity, beyond that of the cultural "nation". 
What is developing in the world today is an extension of the concept of nation beyond 
its strict unilevelled application, to a dual-levelled application. In this century, the great 
experiment has been taking place in Yugosiavia, where, it is hoped, with the passage of 
sufficient time, the Croats, Serbs, Slovènes, and Macedonians, while still certain of their 
national identities, will nevertheless adopt also a sensé of Yugoslavian nationhood. Indivi-
duals would be members of two nations at once, but at separate levels and with no inhé-
rent conflict between the two levels. Of longer duration has been the British expérience. 
The existence of English, Scottish, and Welsh nations is rarely disputed, at least in the 
cultural sensé, and yet ail are commonly included in the concept of a British nation. 
This development has obvious ramifications for Canada. There is in Canada a strong 
conviction that while the Québécois "nation" should be granted ail reasonable means to 
safeguard, foster, develop, and express its national uniqueness, it should also join in with 
the other "nation" or "nations" of Canada to develop an overriding sensé of Canadian 
nation-hood. 
For a group to limit itself to the tight unilevelled nation-state concept is anachronistic, 
constraining, and perhaps somewhat ingrown. For Québec to try to draw an international 
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boundary around itself would be a retreat to the principles which shattered Central Europe 
in 1918. Events since that date hâve proven the bankruptcy of the idea of every ethnie 
nation forming its own state. Interestingly, Western Europe appears to be moving even 
further, perhaps toward the national concept on three levels. While small groups, such as 
the Bretons and Welsh, press for autonomy on a local scale, the established state organi-
zations continue, and beyond that a common European consciousness seems to be slowly 
growing. Thus, in the near future an individual could feel himself to be concurrently a 
member of the Welsh nation, the British nation, and a new European nation. If the latter 
seems far-fetched, one may point out that the E.E.C. is working steadily towards a shared 
consciousness of common European cultural background, towards a common économie 
organization, common planning for the future, and even a common parliament; the three 
principal languages are widely shared. Over time, should thèse not produce a new sensé 
of national kinship beyond the range of the présent state? 
This concept of a two-tiered définition of a nation, that is of nations within and part of 
larger-scaled nations, must be understood as forming the ideological basis for the conti-
nuance of that maddening question, "What does Québec want?" Although the persistence 
of the question annoys Francophones, it represents the continuance of a sensé of 
incompréhension and exaspération on the part of the Anglophones6. The latter are convin-
ced that, as a province, Québec already possesses powers sufficient to ensure the survi-
val and flowering of the Québécois national culture. The typical Anglophone does not see 
anything particularly sacred in the lower-level nation. He sees no inhérent reason why a 
cultural society should automatically become an independent political state. The provincial 
government already possesses control over éducation (the principal base of nationalism) 
and considérable influence on the economy and use of language. Since cultural survival 
seems assured, what more is necessary? Why should the higher-level national identity 
and integrity be endangered for no apparent good reason? 
For the Québécois, however, provincial status is itself galling. The question is not so 
much one of power as of "dignity"7. In as much as it is the homeland of one of the "two 
founding peoples", Québec cannot allow itself to be considered to be no more than the 
equal of nine other units of the same rank. Québec is not a province like the others. The 
arithmetic is itself felt to be a danger and a denigration. At the least Québec must be the 
equal of the nine others combined. Herein lie the roots of the dream of "sovereignty-asso-
ciation": a union of two partners equal in power: Québec and Ottawa on a par. Québec is 
not a province like the others; national feeling suggests that it should not be a province at 
ail. 
In addition, there is the example set by a host of new African and Caribbean states, 
which hâve achieved at least a formai sovereignty out of the colonial structure of the 
British Empire. The comparison of the province to thèse "states" is annoying to ail who 
feel that national self-determination nécessitâtes full political expression. Whether or not 
thèse poor states hâve gained much from their "sovereignty" is rarely discussed; the out-
ward show of independence is the annoying fact. Independence seems to represent that 
ultimate concreteness, that doing away with constraints, which nationalists find highly ap-
pealing. 
Particularly for university students, gaining independence means becoming a man 
among men, the equal of the rulers of the world. They would be masters in their own 
house. A seat in the United Nations, embassies in the great capitals (expensive, alas!), the 
freedom to negotiate with GATT, or perhaps NATO, a distinct passport—thèse are heady 
attractions indeed. Surely a nation deserves ail thèse. If small islands can possess ail 
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such trappings of power and international récognition, why not a sophisticated, modem 
industrial nation of six million? 
The very existence of an internation forum, called The United Nations, has exerted a 
major attraction on the world's peoples. In the early years of this century many cultural 
groups were content, even proud, to be within the great impérial structures of the time. 
Their status was gained through membership and participation inside a recognized world 
power. The advent of the UN helped destroy the old System; it brought the promise of 
world récognition for every state, and hence has led to the multiplication of make-believe 
states composed of would-be nations. Membership in the UN means playing in the Major 
Leagues, and just as the sports leagues hâve expanded to include teams from every 
viable city, so the UN has expanded its embrace to include almost ail possible countries. 
Who will be satisfied with mère internai politics when the rostrum of the General Assem-
bly beckons? 
Beneath thèse positive attractions, lies the unacknowledged sweetness experienced 
by every rising underdog, whether it be the Flemish against the French of Belgium or the 
French against the English of Canada. A vendetta against the past can be safely waged, 
now that it is no longer necessary to do so. 
TERRITORIAL CONSEQUENCES 
Questions of nation, state, and sovereignty could conceivably be little more than irri-
tants, were it not for the fact that Québec is imbedded by geography in the centre of 
Canadian life. Setting aside emotional responses for the moment, one could conceive of 
an easy and amicable séparation were the remainder of Canada not to be severely, ad-
versely affected. But in this case a friendly divorce of the two actors, each set on doing 
his/her own thing, is not possible. Despite ail acrimony, the marriage has not been stérile. 
The original union of Canada East and Canada West has led to the incorporation and 
organization of areas east, west, and north. Historically as well as locationally, Québec lies 
at the heart of this growth. 
The most obvious physical results of a sécession of Québec would be the séparation 
of the Atlantic provinces from the remainder of Canada, and the séparation of Ontario from 
the Atlantic Océan. Both the fragmentation, and the loss of direct access to the sea are 
very serious matters, so serious in fact that it is hard to conceive of any other state in the 
world considering such a possibility calmly. 
For the Parti Québécois "sovereignty" clearly has a higher priority than "association". 
The latter is seen primarily as a means of making the former palatable and opérable. 
Independence is the core, the essence, of the P.Q. platform. It is thus no injustice to 
Québec to state that "association", or co-operation could not be relied upon to maintain 
securely and without hindrances, the land transport connections between Ontario, and 
New Brunswick and Labrador. If Québec is to be sovereign, her sovereignty must include 
control over her own transport Systems. Thèse Systems will be operated for the benefit of 
the people and economy of Québec. This is obvious and just, and hence internai connec-
tions will always hâve priority over those external ties which are not felt to be necessary, or 
which are primarily for the benefit of an external state. It is common knowledge that local 
roads tend to stub end at boundaries, and that even the international truck lines tend to 
décline in carrying capacity close to boundaries. If Québec were to follow the normal 
model, one could expect excellent highways from Montréal to Québec, good roads from 
Québec to Rivière du Loup, and poor connections from Rivière du Loup into New 
Brunswick. 
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Even if no hindrances to through traffic developed, the psychological impact of the 
séparation would remain. Territorial integrity, a land continuity from one shore to the other, 
is vital to the national self-image. Even if co-operation across intervening territory is proven 
pragmatically to be opérable, the psychological sensé of rupture will remain. 
The Polish Corridor, although an extrême case, is nevertheless an instructive exam-
ple. Président Woodrow Wilson, in his Fourteen Points, made explicit the need for Poland 
to hâve a safe and secure outlet to the sea. He recognized that, to be truly independent, 
Poland could not dépend on German ports for its foreign ties. Unfortunately, the création 
of the corridor required the séparation of East Prussia from the remainder of Germany, 
and this séparation was announced blatantly on every map of Europe. Even though Po-
land was the weaker state, obviously no physical threat to Germany, and allowed unobs-
tructed movement across the corridor, the Germans found it extremely difficult to accept 
the cutting away of a portion of their territory. It is well known what capital Hitler made of 
this feeling of outrage. Germany had been geteilt and had to be territorially reunited. 
It would be a mistake to attribute such feelings only to the Nazi abberation. AN nations 
are repelled by a séparation of territory, particularly one imposed a posteriori. We do tend 
to envisage the world in terms of shapes. Our country, and our provinces are commonly 
depicted in newspapers and on télévision by their shapes, their outlines. A Canada with 
outlying pièces (Labrador would also appear to be a disconnected fragment), with a void 
where Québec used to be, would scarcely be acceptable. 
The sensé of séparation would be felt most extremely by the résidents of the severed 
pièces. A feeling of isolation would be inévitable. The people of the Maritimes might conti-
nue to maintain their loyalty to Canada, but they could not help but feel themselves to be 
totally removed from the decision-making centres. To use a contemporary image, they 
would resemble those second-class delegates who watch proceedings over closed-circuit 
T.V., while the delegates with power and influence are participating actively in the main 
meeting hall. 
Under the circumstances, it implies no disloyalty to suggest that the Atlantic Pro-
vinces—or the Maritimes without Newfoundland-Labrador—could be motivated to seek 
their own political destiny8. One Québec author even suggested a confédération of the 
East, as well as a confédération of the West9. Certainly, the Eastern peoples already 
possess their own history, outlook, and way-of-life, which are distinct from those of Ontario 
or the Western provinces. Their sensé of localism and regionalism are virtually as strong 
as those of Québec. Ail that is wanting is internai unity and a sufficient economy; gas and 
oil could supply the latter. One could then easily envisage the Atlantic provinces acting as 
free trade ports and fuel suppliers for much of Eastern North America. Ail this is highiy 
spéculative, of course, but the conditions for an attempt to seek their own destiny are not 
hypothetical. 
The St. Lawrence Seaway bears the potentialities of future problems. The entrance 
into the Seaway proper, the St. Lambert lock, as well as the locks at Beauharnois and 
Valleyfield, are within Québec, but it is important to note that the St. Lambert lock is above 
the port of Montréal. The ocean-going vessels which enter the Great Lakes are by-passing 
Montréal, Québec City, and Sorel. The Seaway profits Québec in two ways: by allowing 
the movement of Québec ores to the iron and steel plants on the Lakes, and the tranship-
ment of grains and other goods from the "Lakers" to the "Salties". In tonnage, the first of 
thèse is now by far the more important, but the latter may hâve the greater promise for the 
future as more and more ocean-going vessels become too large to squeeze into the Sea-
way locks. 
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Because of the importance of the Seaway to the United States and to Ontario, the 
maintenance of the System would undoubtedly be guaranteed by treaty, regardless of the 
status of Québec and Canada. However, in this âge of continually changing technology, 
maintenance is not enough. Expensive improvements and enlargements quickly become 
advisable or even necessary. The central portion of the Welland Canal has already been 
replaced, and plans to further modernize the main séries of locks hâve been articulated. 
Any proposais to enlarge or modernize the lower Seaway would necessarily include Qué-
bec, which would thus be placed in the uncomfortable position of being asked to partici-
pate in the improvement of a System designed to divert water trade away from îts own 
ports. Without imputing any ill motives, one can assume that sovereign Québec would be 
strongly tempted to invest in its own ports, rather than in a means of easing ocean-going 
ships into the Great Lakes. Ontario, on the other hand, would of course suffer the insecu-
rity of being dépendent upon an unenthusiastic Québec for the maintenance of its water 
connections with the Atlantic. 
In a récent geography class composed mostly of honours students, the students were 
asked to deal with the question of Québec-Canadian boundaries, assuming a sécession of 
Québec from the Fédération. It was intriguing to note how strongly the students felt about 
the matters discussed above. Half the papers called for an extension of Canadian territory 
to St. Lambert, in order to include the entire Seaway within Canada, and almost as many 
proposed the cession of a strip of territory from Ontario to New Brunswick (some called for 
the whole south shore!), so as to secure a territorial connection between the two remaining 
portions of Canada. The latter idea, if implemented, would of course, separate Québec 
from ail direct contact with the United States. Obviously thèse third-year students had little 
compréhension of Québécois feelings for their homeland, and their plans should be given 
weight only in the sensé that they point out an underlying concern with territorial continuity. 
A possible économie conséquence of séparation would be the loss to remnant Canada 
of about a quarter of its internai market. Granted, the concept of sovereignty-association 
présupposes, as of now, the continued existence of a common market with no border 
control points, after the séparation. However, it can be taken as certain that a newly inde-
pendent Québec would endeavour to support and enlarge its own industries. It must be 
borne in mind that the E.E.C. countries came together after their industries had been well 
established on the basis of their internai markets. With a fairly secure home base, the 
E.E.C. presented them with great potentialities for expansion. Québec, on the other hand, 
would be in the position of trying to broaden its industrial base, which has, until now, been 
heavily dépendent on textiles, paper, and basic refining. It is hard to imagine an indepen-
dent Québec allowing the continuance of a situation where the metal-fabricating industries 
remain concentrated in Ontario and expanding in the West. Whether through import res-
trictions, or heavy governmental funding of compétitive industries in Québec, remnant Ca-
nada would hâve to expect inconveniences at best, curtailment at worst. Because of its 
concentration on machinery, and its proximity to Québec, Ontario would probably be in a 
more vulnérable position than would the Western provinces10. 
It is not the rôle of this paper to forecast internai developments in Québec, but it does 
seem probable that the funds for massive investments in new enterprises would necessa-
rily corne from governmental sources. A State Socialist economy, based increasingly on 
the East European économie model, would appear to be a distinct future possibility11. 
The major portion of remnant Canada, that from Ontario to British Columbia, would 
probably expérience a pronounced économie and psychological shift to the west. Ties to 
the Atlantic world would appear to be severely weakened at a time when the West would 
continue to expérience rapid growth. This portion would seem to hâve two distinct core 
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areas: Southern Ontario in the East, Alberta-British Columbia in the West. The former 
could be expected to décline, as the plénitude of resources, the westward shift of Ameri-
can population, and the increasing trading importance of the Pacific, gradually pulled the 
Canadian centre of gravity towards the West. Thousands of miles of Shield and Prairie 
would separate the new locus of power from the aging industrial outlier by Lake Ontario. 
Watching her former dominance and prosperity ebb and pass into the hands of distant, 
unsympathetic cities, Ontario could even be tempted to follow the model set by Québec, 
and opt for the seductive security of a small-scale independence, incredible as that may 
now seem. And thus the balkanization of Canada would be completed. 
A number of problems of border définition would arise too, in fact some hâve already 
been discussed in the press. Although most commonly no change in the boundaries is 
anticipated or called for, there are still five potential problem areas which deserve exami-
nation: the North, Labrador, the Ottawa Valley, New Brunswick and the spécial case of 
Montréal. 
In the North, the question concerns the particular extent of Québec which is to be 
considered. Again, it is fair to say that most people think of Québec as it is now, in its 
entirety, probably as a response to existing political realities, and to the shape made fami-
liar to us by maps and télévision. However, there are people who feel that the Québec 
which would leave confédération should be the Québec which entered, that is the territory 
within the St. Lawrence watershed. Others would extend the area to the line existing before 
the final enlargement of i.912. The existence of massive Québec investment in the James 
Bay Power project and in the iron-mining district hâve de facto carried Québec's effective 
control well beyond the pre-1912 line. The récent agreements negotiated with the native 
peoples of the James Bay Area, hâve added an extra dimension of legality to Québec 
rights over that district. 
However, even beyond James Bay and Schefferville lies a full quarter of the area of 
Québec. Retaining this for Canada would maintain the unity of the Arctic lands within 
Canada, and there is no doubt that most Anglophone Canadians view the administration of 
the Arctic lands as a particularly Fédéral responsibility and duty. It is safe to say that most 
Canadians do not feel the shores of Hudson Bay, Davis Strait and Ungava Bay to be 
Québécois in any sensé of the word. 
Most of the résidents on those coasts are Inuit, Eskimo. Whatever the reason may be, 
Canadians seem to be able to imagine Indians becoming integrated citizens of Québec, 
but not the Inuit. The existence of a common Fédéral policy for the Inuit, and its extension 
to ail the Inuit, seems to demand the inclusion of Povungnituk and Chimo with Tuktoyuktuk 
and Frobisher Bay, rather than with places to the South. Canadians do feel a responsibility 
for the welfare and advancement of thèse native peoples and even now are not friendly to 
the idea of their being bound jurisdictionally to a nationalistic régime in Québec City. More 
than any question of territory in itself, or of natural resources, it is this feeling for the rights 
and needs of the Inuit which will tend to keep the question of Northern Québec open. 
The Ottawa Valley is a différent kind of problem. The valley lowland has developed as 
a cultural-economic unit bordered by two portions of the Shield. The idéal location for a 
boundary would hâve been along the highland rims either Northeast or Southwest of the 
valley. It is unfortunate that the colonial administrators in London made use of the easy, 
visible line of the river instead of the more subtle but also more accurate line of a highland 
rim. It is now too late to make any appréciable changes. Francophones and Anglophones 
live intermixed on both sides of the river. They hâve begun to sort themselves out because 
of the pressures introduced by educational policies decreed from two capitals, each hun-
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dreds of miles away and out of touch with the valley. In the middie of this cultural corridor 
an international boundary would be most unfortunate. 
The Ottawa-Hull metropolitan area would defy solution. The massive Fédéral move-
ment into Hull has made the situation virtually impossible to unravel in the event of any 
future attempt at sécession. A unit separate from and yet in both countries might be 
suggested, along the lines of the Saar Basin, which functioned twice as an international 
unit, open to both Germany and France. However, the Saar was not the capital of either 
country. Canada could scarcely be expected to hâve its capital in a neutral international 
"free city." 
The problem of the boundary with Labrador has been well studied and presented by 
Henri Dorion and hence requires little further élaboration12. It is interesting to note that 
many Québec maps are reluctant to show the présent boundary, much as many Germans 
still try to depict the BRD-DDR line as inconspicuously as possible. Once again we see the 
psychological importance of maps; clear cartographie présentation implies acceptance. 
Unfortunately the boundary runs through the principal zone of development of the 
area, and thus bifurcates a compact région of mining and power development. Whichever 
province the resource may fall within, the ore or power must be moved out through Qué-
bec, at least as of now. Québec has long felt that the 1927 award was unjust. A nationalis-
ée government, free of internai Canadian restraints, could well seek the rectification of this 
"imperialist" boundary. 
The border with New Brunswick is perhaps the most marked area where cultural 
factors and political boundaries are not in agreement. Currently, the existing boundary has 
pre-eminence; the P.Q. does not seem to want to, or be able to, look beyond Québec. 
Within New Brunswick, the Acadians hâve clearly developed their own cultural identity; 
they feel that they can best work out their destiny either within the province, or within the 
framework of a new political unit along both shores of the Northumberland Strait. 
History has shown that ail this,could change. The Acadians already fear that a Mari-
time union would swamp them with the greater number of Anglophones in Nova Scotia. As 
pointed out previously, a sécession of Québec could provide added impetus towards the 
achievement of a union of the Maritime provinces. In Québec, an independence achieved 
by and powered by nationalism, must be expected to direct the attention of its people to 
the submerged confrères outside. Irredentism is a powerful emotional force, even in a 
world committed to the maintenance of existing boundaries. 
Finally, there is the matter of Montréal itself. It is difficult even for an outsider to 
envisage the jurisdictional splitting of the metropolitan area along language lines. The 
Islands and the South Shore clearly form an économie unit and must operate as such if 
they are to hâve continued viability. Still, since language has been emphasized so stron-
gly, it is worth noting that there are more Anglophones than Fracophones in the stretch 
between Côte-des-Neiges Road and the Ontario border. On the basis of numbers alone, 
on the démocratie principle of one man-one vote the local citizenry could call for the mo-
vement of the boundary eastward to the middie of the Mount Royal itself, absurd as that 
may seem otherwise. 
Viewed from Ontario, then, a sécession of Québec from confédération would not only 
split the existing Canadian corpus into three or more segments, but would also give rise to 
a host of possible problems and conflicts. Remnant Canada would consist of two portions, 
each of which would face a re-orientation away from the centre, towards the peripheral 
océans. Severe économie dislocations would occur in Ontario, and probably in Québec as 
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well. The St. Lawrence Seaway, the disposition of Ottawa-Hull, the responsibility for the 
huit, the Labrador border, and the matter of the protection of the linguistic minorities both 
in Québec and in remnant Canada, would provide numerous possibilities for disa-
greement. The psychological impact of the splitting on one side, and the tight enclosing on 
the other, would be more profound than is now customarily anticipated. The P.Q. assump-
tion that the aims of the two partners, Canada and Québec, would always be in harmony, 
sounds incredibly naive. 
The United States would inevitably be involved, and we can be sure that the Ameri-
cans would not look with favour at the prospect of an unstable Canada, or of an 
ideologicaly-powered State Socialist régime on the Northern border of New York. Except 
for the opportunity to dance on the world stage, it is probable that Québec would enjoy 
more true independence and a fuller sensé of nation-hood within Canada than she would 
as a "sovereign" state. 
THE NEW NATIONALISM 
Since I assume that this paper will be read by many résidents of Québec, may I add a 
Personal cautionary note. Please do not underestimate the strength of Canadian nationa-
lism. One sensés a tendency for the Québécois to believe that only they hâve a strong 
sensé of nation-hood, and that Anglophone Canadians are unemotional with little attach-
ment to their country. There appears to be the belief that Anglo-Canadians are primarily 
pragmatic, will always be willing to negotiate, and hence will always give way in the face of 
spirited, intransigent nationalism. Like ail caricatures, such a belief is only partially true, 
and as such may be dangerous. 
Among our young in particular, a strong Canadian nationalism has been in évidence 
for the past fifteen years. In the beginning this was a négative reaction to events in the 
United States, but it quickly deepened into a positive love of one's country. Those astute 
analysts of the public mood, the advertisers, recognized this development quickly. The 
vignette of scènes from coast to coast has become a standard of TV ads. The conception 
of a Canada from sea to sea is strong. One nation, the Canadian nation, is envisaged as 
being great enough to encompass, without conflict, the richness and vitality of our two or 
more constituent nations. 
What the reaction of this younger génération to actual séparation would be is unpre-
dictable. Much would dépend on the accidents of spécifie events, but we can be sure that 
the situation would be délicate. A discussion in a committee room, sealed by a handshake, 
is not a realistic expectation. It is a fact of human expérience that fédérations which hâve 
lasted over a century, do not dissolve easily. This is especially true when the portion 
leaving contains a major pôle of économie life, the principal internai transport link, the 
access to the sea, and the very seeds of national history. 
Finally, it should not be necessary to point out that some anti-French feeling still exists 
in parts of Canada. The efforts of the past twenty years hâve greatly weakened the inten-
sity of this old préjudice, but the séparation of Québec would allow it free rein. J.-M.-
R. Villeneuve's idea that splitting the Fédération would actually help "nos frères de la 
dispersion", is completely unrealistic13. Beyond doubt, a sécession by Québec would 
mean an abandonment of the Francophones in remnant Canada, and a major dilution of 
the richness of Canadian cultural life. 
June 1979 
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NOTES 
1
 "Québécois" means a Francophone résident of Québec. It is used in préférence to "Que-
becker". If the Parti Québécois is being referred to, it will be labelled either as such or as P.Q. 
2
 "When a race ceases to express its thoughts and feelings in its own language,... it is lost as a 
race. The préservation of language is absolutely necessary for the préservation of a race, its spirit, its 
character, and tempérament." BOURASSA, Henri (28 June, 1912): "La Langue française et l'avenir 
de notre race", in COOK, Ramsay (éd.) (1969): French Canadian Nationalism, and anthology, Toronto, 
MacMillan of Canada, 132-151. 
3
 Until the 1950's, Québécois nationalism was expressed strongly in religious terms, based on the 
concept of a divine mission. 
4
 It is interesting to note that in 1952 André Laurendeau stated that the idea of a homeland had 
diminished in importance: "L'idée de patrie subit une diminution dans le monde occidental." Intellec-
tuals of the time were still reacting against the excesses of territorial nationalisms in the two World 
Wars. However, the idea of homeland has returned strongly in the 1970's. LAURENDEAU, André 
(Dec. 1952) Y a-t-il une crise du nationalisme? L'Action nationale, XL, 210-11. 
5
 In a perceptive analysis Dion has shown how the divorce of nationalism from religion has led to 
the emphasis on the state. "... l'État a été conçu comme l'expression finale et parfaite du devenir de 
la nation", DION, Léon (Nov. 1957) Le Nationalisme pessimiste: sa source, sa signification, sa vali-
dité, Cité Libre, 10. 
6
 For the sake of simplicity, this discussion treats Canadians as being either Anglophones or 
Francophones. It is assumed that immigrants will in time assimilate into one of the two groups, even if 
they do manage to maintain their ancestral culture as well. It is my expérience that récent immigrants 
tend to be strongly in favor of one, undivided Canada. 
7
 CHAPUT, Marcel (1961) Pourquoi je suis séparatiste, Montréal, Les Éditions du Jour. 
8
 On the other hand, ties with "Central Canada" hâve been greatly strengthened in récent years 
by the migration of over two hundred thousand persons from the Atlantic provinces to Ontario. 
9
 "Mais peut-être nous sera-t-il permis de suggérer une solution à la difficulté: refaire le Dominion 
sur de nouvelles bases; le subdiviser en deux ou plusieurs confédérations. La province de Québec, 
avec la partie française d'Ontario et du Nouveau-Brunswick, pourrait former une confédération; le 
reste des provinces maritimes une autre; la partie anglaise de l'Ontario et de l'Ouest, une troisième, 
Peut-être même la province de Québec et les provinces de l'Est pourraient-elles former une seule 
confédération, leurs intérêts matériels étant assez identiques." 
TARDIVEL, J.-P. (15 avril 1905) La Vérité, 2. 
10
 The value of trade between Ontario and Québec is now in the vicinity of four billion dollars per 
year in each direction. 
11
"... State intervention continues to increase: it is inévitable where nations are complète masters 
of their destiny. How much more will this be so in the case of a nation like ours, whose future dépends 
on the vigour, the dynamism and the political and financial means of the State." 
LEGER, Jean-Marc, Where Does Neo-Nationalism Lead?, in COOK, Ramsay, op. cit. 311. This 
is a translation of: Le néo-nationalisme, où conduit-il?, Les Nouveaux Québécois, 3e Congrès des 
Affaires Canadiennes 1963, Québec, Les Presses de l'Université Laval, 1964, 41-58. 
12
 DORION, Henri (1963), La Frontière Québec-Terreneuve, Québec, Les Presses de l'Université 
Laval. 
13
 VILLENEUVE, J.-M.-R. (1923) Et nos frères de la dispersion, Notre Avenir politique : Enquête 
de l'Action française, 1922, Montréal, Bibliothèque de l'Action Française, 113-39. 
